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Essay · 14 November 2026

Spinoza — God Was Never Outside the Universe

Imagine telling a seventeenth-century philosopher that God is not a supernatural manager sitting somewhere outside the universe, occasionally reaching in to adjust the machinery.

Now imagine going one step further.

What if God is not outside reality at all?

What if the infinite reality in which everything exists is what the word God is supposed to describe?

At this point, a number of religious authorities would probably begin looking for the door.

Baruch Spinoza had a habit of asking questions that made existing doors rather important.

He proposed a universe with exactly one fundamental substance. Everything else—people, planets, trees, thoughts, bodies, conversations and the ordinary chaos of existence—belongs within that single reality.

It was bold, unsettling and extraordinarily systematic.

It also gives us one of the closest philosophical comparisons with The Smiling Monad.

But close isn't identical.

And the differences are where the discussion becomes interesting.

The man who wouldn't leave the question alone

Spinoza was born in Amsterdam in 1632 into a Portuguese-Jewish family. His community lived within a Dutch republic renowned for certain freedoms but also marked by fierce religious and political conflicts.

He received a Jewish education, encountered Latin learning and modern philosophy, and eventually developed views that placed him at odds with the religious authorities of his community.

In 1656, at the age of twenty-three, he was placed under a herem, a severe ban issued by Amsterdam's Portuguese-Jewish congregation.

The surviving document condemns his views without supplying a neat, complete account of precisely what he had said or believed at that point. Historians therefore caution against turning his break with the community into a simple morality play.

It would be easy to portray the story as a brave free thinker defeated by uniformly intolerant religious people.

That would also erase a complicated historical world, including a community whose members had lived with persecution and were negotiating their place in a sometimes dangerous society.

Spinoza continued studying and writing.

He became associated with lens-making and lived a comparatively modest life, though some of the colourful anecdotes attached to him are less certain than popular biographies suggest.

His major work, Ethics, was completed during his lifetime but published after his death in 1677.

And the title is a rather amusing choice.

You might expect a book called Ethics to begin by explaining how people should treat one another.

Spinoza begins by examining the structure of existence itself.

Apparently, before deciding whether people should be kind, it would be useful to establish what the universe actually is.

A fair point, although it does delay the practical advice.

One substance. Everything else within it.

Spinoza's argument begins with the idea of a substance: something that exists in itself and can be conceived through itself, rather than depending for its existence on something more fundamental.

He concluded that there is only one substance.

He called it God—or Nature, often represented by the Latin expression Deus sive Natura.

Now we need to be careful.

This is not simply the familiar claim that God made nature.

Nor is it the idea of a human-like deity living somewhere in the cosmos and issuing instructions.

For Spinoza, everything that exists is within the one infinite substance.

Individual things are not independent substances standing alongside God.

They are modes: particular ways the substance is expressed.

Picture waves on the ocean.

One wave rises, another falls, and each has a distinctive shape and history.

None is a separate ocean.

The image is useful, though imperfect. Spinoza's metaphysics is more rigorous and more complicated than a picture of water.

Still, the central shift is enormous.

Instead of beginning with a universe made of fundamentally separate entities and asking how they fit together, Spinoza begins with a single underlying reality and asks how the variety of things we encounter belongs within it.

That's where the comparison with The Smiling Monad becomes unavoidable.

The Smiling Monad also begins with unity and sees individuality as expression rather than absolute separation.

But Spinoza did not straightforwardly identify the one substance with consciousness.

He understood thought and extension—roughly, the mental and physical aspects of reality—as attributes of the one substance known to the human mind. He held that the substance has infinitely many attributes, not merely those two.

For The Smiling Monad, the ultimate source is proposed to be consciousness.

For Spinoza, describing God or Nature as merely a universal mind would be a misleading reduction of his system.

The family resemblance is substantial.

The metaphysical difference is real.

Thought and matter: two descriptions, one reality

Consider your body and your mind.

For centuries, philosophers have wondered how an immaterial mind could interact with a physical body.

If the mind is one kind of substance and the body is another, what connects them?

Where does thought reach into matter and move an arm?

Does a tiny invisible manager inside the skull operate a set of controls?

And if so, who operates the manager?

Descartes's dualist philosophy made the relationship between mind and body an especially difficult problem.

Spinoza took a different route.

Mind and body are not two independently existing substances that somehow need to exchange messages.

They are understood through different attributes of the same reality.

For a human being, the mind and body are, in a significant sense, one and the same individual understood differently.

The order and connection of ideas corresponds to the order and connection of things.

This is sometimes described as parallelism, though the label can oversimplify his actual position.

The important point is that he rejected the image of a detachable mind operating a fundamentally separate machine.

That resonates with contemporary discussions of embodied experience, but we shouldn't mistake it for a modern neuroscientific theory.

Spinoza wasn't conducting brain scans.

He was developing metaphysical arguments.

His account may inspire philosophical reflection on mind and body without providing experimental proof of how consciousness arises.

And the Smiling Monad has the same obligation to distinguish an interpretive picture from scientific evidence.

We aren't exceptions to nature

One of Spinoza's most radical moves was refusing to place human beings outside the natural order.

Human emotions, ambitions, fears and decisions were not to be treated as supernatural interruptions.

They belonged within nature and could be investigated through causes.

This may sound ordinary today.

It was not an ordinary claim in his historical context.

We have an enduring tendency to treat human behaviour as though it operates according to a unique set of rules.

When a storm arrives, we study weather conditions.

When a person becomes angry, we sometimes decide the explanation is simply that they're an awful person.

Perhaps they are behaving awfully.

But the explanation may involve fear, habits, bodily state, social experience, learned expectations and surrounding circumstances.

Understanding those causes doesn't eliminate accountability.

It can make a response more intelligent.

A person who repeatedly reacts badly to a particular situation may benefit from a change in the situation, support to recognise the pattern or a different way of communicating.

Simply shouting Stop doing that! may prove remarkably ineffective.

Especially if the shouting becomes another part of the situation that produces the distress.

Spinoza's naturalism invites us to investigate rather than merely condemn.

This is not a demand to excuse harmful behaviour.

It's an acknowledgement that explaining behaviour and deciding how to respond to it are connected tasks.

The strange business of wanting to continue

Spinoza introduced the idea of conatus: the striving by which each finite thing endeavours to persevere in its being.

This wasn't a claim that every object consciously dreams of a long and satisfying retirement.

The striving belongs to the way finite things exist and act according to their nature.

In human experience, it helps explain desire and motivation.

We seek what supports our continued activity and flourishing.

We resist what diminishes or threatens us.

That striving is not always accompanied by a clear understanding of its causes.

Indeed, Spinoza believed we can be conscious of our desires while remaining unaware of much of what produces them.

A person might insist they chose a particular decision entirely independently.

But perhaps the decision was shaped by fear, social pressure, exhaustion or a history of experiences they haven't fully recognised.

This is uncomfortable because we like imagining ourselves as the sole authors of our choices.

It is also potentially liberating.

If we understand more of what shapes us, we may become better able to respond.

Not perfectly.

Not magically.

But with a little less confusion.

Joy is not merely a cheerful facial expression

Here Spinoza becomes especially interesting for a philosophy called The Smiling Monad.

He gave joy a central place in his account of human experience.

But he didn't mean that everyone should wander around grinning like an enthusiastic salesperson.

For Spinoza, joy involves a transition toward greater power or capacity to act.

Sadness involves a transition toward lesser power.

These are technical claims within his theory of the affects.

They are not a simple ranking of people by how happy they look.

Consider someone learning to swim.

At first, the water is frightening. Their movements are restricted by uncertainty.

Through practice and trusted guidance, they develop skill.

Eventually, the same environment offers freedom, play and pleasure.

Their capacity to participate has increased.

Spinoza's account gives us a way to consider why that change can be experienced as joyful.

Now consider someone forced to participate in an activity they dislike.

They may obey instructions, but their confidence and sense of agency may shrink.

Outward compliance doesn't establish flourishing.

That is a useful distinction.

The Smiling Monad's invitation to find happiness should never become a requirement to appear happy.

A person can be quiet and content.

They can express joy through movement or rhythm.

They can need space, rest or solitude.

And sadness may be a completely understandable response to loss or injustice.

The goal is not to erase the whole range of human emotion.

It's to recognise what helps individuals live with greater freedom, security and satisfaction.

Spinoza's technical account and The Smiling Monad's practical emphasis aren't identical, but they create a productive conversation.

Why fear makes such a useful political instrument

Spinoza was interested in how emotions shape societies.

People who are frightened may become more susceptible to manipulation.

They can seek certainty at almost any cost.

And someone offering an absolute explanation may acquire extraordinary influence by promising protection from uncertainty.

This creates opportunities for religious and political authorities.

A ruler announces a danger.

The population becomes anxious.

The ruler offers protection in exchange for obedience.

The arrangement works especially well if the danger can never be fully resolved.

There is always another emergency, another enemy and another reason why questioning authority would be irresponsible.

Humanity has developed this mechanism to an impressive level of sophistication.

We even manage to fit advertisements into it.

Spinoza criticised superstition and the political use of religious fear.

His Theological-Political Treatise, published anonymously in 1670, defended freedom of philosophical enquiry and challenged attempts to make interpretations of scripture into compulsory political truth.

The book caused enormous controversy.

Its concern remains strikingly modern.

A society in which people cannot question prevailing ideas may look orderly.

It may also become less capable of recognising when its institutions are wrong.

Reason and freedom of enquiry are not simply hobbies for university departments.

They are safeguards against concentrated power.

Love your neighbour—but what does reason have to do with it?

An especially valuable part of Spinoza's philosophy is easy to miss if we concentrate entirely on substance and attributes.

He did not imagine the good life as a purely private intellectual achievement.

In his Ethics, he argued that people guided by reason have powerful grounds for cooperation and friendship.

He developed the idea that the good we rationally seek for ourselves is something we can also wish for others.

Within his account of the active affects, he treated the desire to aid others and establish friendships as significant expressions of rational activity.

There's a delightful challenge here to the idea that human beings are necessarily isolated competitors.

Suppose you're living in a community.

Your wellbeing depends partly on the people around you being safe, capable and able to participate.

A neighbour who feels secure is in a better position to cooperate.

A friend who is flourishing may bring new possibilities into your life.

A society that offers education, health and opportunity creates conditions from which many individuals benefit.

Helping another person need not be understood as sacrificing your interests to an entirely unrelated being.

Our interests can be connected.

Spinoza's argument for cooperation is more complicated than that example, and it emerges from his particular theory of reason and human nature.

But it challenges the image of rationality as cold, competitive self-interest.

Sometimes the reasonable thing to do is to help someone else.

Imagine that.

A philosopher spends a lifetime constructing a grand account of infinity and eventually discovers that friendship is useful.

We could have told him over a cup of tea.

Then again, he probably would have asked what a cup of tea really is.

The uncomfortable problem with pity

Spinoza's discussion of pity is difficult, and it deserves attention rather than polite avoidance.

He regarded pity as a form of sadness arising from another person's suffering.

Because he associated sadness with diminished power to act, he argued that someone guided by reason would seek to help another person without being governed by pity.

This sounds harsh.

Surely feeling another person's pain can encourage compassion?

It can.

And modern psychology offers a variety of ways to distinguish empathic concern, personal distress and compassionate action.

Spinoza's point was not that we should ignore someone who suffers.

He explicitly regarded helping others as important.

His concern was that becoming overwhelmed by another person's distress might not be the most effective basis for action.

There is something worth considering in that argument.

A supporter who panics whenever another person becomes upset may unintentionally add to the distress.

Remaining calm can make it easier to offer practical help.

But there is also a danger in dismissing emotional resonance too quickly.

Feeling with others can alert us to needs we might otherwise overlook.

The Smiling Monad should not make a virtue of emotional detachment.

Its concern is to combine responsive attention with useful action.

Care involves noticing another person, allowing their experience to matter and choosing a response that respects their needs.

There is no prize for being the most philosophically composed person in the room while somebody else is asking for help.

The scandal of freedom without absolute free will

Spinoza did not accept the familiar picture of free will as an uncaused power to choose independently of the natural order.

In his account, events follow from causes.

Our choices do not emerge from an invisible region exempt from reality's laws.

You might expect that to make freedom impossible.

Instead, he gave freedom a different meaning.

A person becomes freer as they understand the causes shaping their actions and act more fully from their own nature, guided by adequate ideas rather than being pushed around blindly by external influences.

It's a challenging form of freedom.

You're not a miniature supernatural monarch directing reality from the privacy of your skull.

You're part of nature, and increased understanding can alter how you participate within it.

This perspective has practical force.

Imagine someone trapped in a repeated pattern of fear.

They react to unfamiliar situations in ways they later regret.

If they understand more about what triggers the fear and acquire support to respond differently, their options may expand.

We can describe that change through psychology and learning without endorsing Spinoza's entire metaphysics.

But the philosophical lesson is useful.

Freedom may depend less on being unaffected by the world than on understanding how we're affected and gaining meaningful capacity to respond.

The Smiling Monad approaches individuality within one shared consciousness, while still emphasising participant choice.

That raises a similar challenge.

A philosophical commitment to freedom means little if people aren't given the time, information, opportunities or communication supports required to exercise it.

Freedom isn't merely a word in a mission statement.

It has to be experienced.

A democracy with some rather serious exclusions

Spinoza's political writing defended substantial freedoms of thought and expression, and he regarded democratic arrangements as especially important.

That was striking in an era shaped by religious conflict and authoritarian politics.

Yet his account was not equivalent to modern universal democracy.

In his unfinished Political Treatise, the proposed democratic system excludes groups including women, servants and foreigners.

This is an enormous limitation.

It would be dishonest to celebrate his commitment to freedom without noticing the people who would have been denied full participation.

And it illustrates a problem that appears repeatedly throughout history.

A thinker develops a grand account of human nature.

The argument sounds universal.

Then we examine who is actually included.

Suddenly the universal has acquired a number of very convenient exceptions.

The Smiling Monad's philosophical claim about one interconnected reality must remain open to this kind of scrutiny.

If every person's perspective matters, that principle cannot be suspended whenever the person is inconvenient, unfamiliar or lacking social power.

Nor should we assume that speaking about universal love automatically removes structural inequality.

Recognition must be accompanied by rights, accessible participation and accountability.

Otherwise the philosophy risks becoming another beautiful description of a world that doesn't exist for everyone.

Was everything inevitable?

Spinoza's account of reality is closely associated with necessity.

If everything follows from the nature of the one substance, could things have been otherwise?

Many scholars interpret him as holding a powerful form of necessitarianism, although there are continuing debates about the details.

It's a difficult prospect.

We experience decisions as open.

We imagine alternatives.

We plan, improvise and create things that did not previously exist in our lives.

Spinoza asks whether those experiences of possibility reflect a deeper metaphysical openness or our limited understanding of what determines events.

The decisive difference concerns how we understand creation: a reality still unfolding is not quite Spinoza's necessity-governed order.

That gives its account of creativity a different emphasis.

Individual experiences contribute to the unfolding variety of reality.

But there is a philosophical obligation here.

Calling reality 'infinite' does not automatically prove that every imagined possibility can occur.

Nor does invoking universal consciousness answer the problem of causal necessity.

If the future is genuinely open, what makes it open?

If it is determined, what becomes of responsibility, discovery and choice?

These are not questions to settle through enthusiasm.

Spinoza's rigor is useful precisely because it makes vague answers uncomfortable.

A philosophy improves when it can survive difficult questions.

Spinoza and Leibniz: two very different kinds of unity

Our previous essay examined Leibniz and his universe of windowless monads.

It's worth placing the two philosophers beside one another.

Leibniz defended a plurality of genuine substances coordinated through pre-established harmony.

Spinoza defended one substance, with individual things understood as modes of it.

Leibniz famously argued that God chooses the best of possible worlds.

Spinoza's system, at least on an influential interpretation, leaves no comparable menu of alternative worlds from which God selects.

For Leibniz, the many exist as distinct substances harmonised by God.

For Spinoza, the many exist within one substance.

The Smiling Monad is much closer to Spinoza at that structural level.

But there is still a decisive difference.

Its proposed universal source is consciousness, while Spinoza's one substance is not reducible to thought alone.

And The Smiling Monad's emphasis on emerging, shared experiences does not simply repeat Spinoza's necessitarian naturalism.

The comparison is interesting because the similarities are real enough that the disagreements matter.

We're not collecting famous names to decorate a theory.

We're asking how different accounts of reality handle the same enduring questions.

What is individuality?

What makes connection possible?

What is freedom?

Why do emotions matter?

What changes when we recognise ourselves as part of something larger?

God isn't a man with a clipboard

Spinoza's rejection of a human-like deity carries another intriguing possibility.

If God or Nature is the ultimate reality, there is no supernatural official sitting outside existence deciding which people deserve sunshine and which deserve rain.

Nature does not arrange events according to human preferences.

A storm may destroy something beautiful.

An illness may strike someone kind.

An accident may change a life.

Those events do not become morally acceptable because they belong within nature.

And they don't necessarily imply that the universe has chosen to punish someone.

The Smiling Monad similarly resists treating suffering as evidence of a cosmic punishment system.

But it gives the larger reality a more explicitly conscious character.

That raises difficult questions of its own.

If the source is consciousness, should we think of it as intending particular events?

If the unfolding includes cruelty, how do we avoid treating that cruelty as something the source wanted?

A careful answer should not make the pain of individuals disappear into metaphysical abstractions.

The existence of a whole doesn't cancel the significance of its parts.

Whatever explanation we favour, preventable suffering remains something humans can and should address.

The intellectual love of a world we don't control

In the final part of the Ethics, Spinoza explored the possibility of a deeper understanding of God or Nature, associated with what he called the intellectual love of God.

This was not merely an instruction to feel warm affection toward the physical universe.

It belonged to his account of knowledge, eternity and the highest form of human flourishing.

The closer we come to understanding reality through adequate ideas, the less completely we may be ruled by fluctuating passions and confused fears.

His ideal is demanding.

It proposes a kind of freedom that comes from seeing ourselves within the order of nature rather than imagining ourselves detached from it.

This isn't quite the same as The Smiling Monad's invitation to be comfortably happy within an ongoing, shared experience.

The Smiling Monad is less interested in making intellectual mastery the centre of everyday life.

A person doesn't need to become a seventeenth-century metaphysician to enjoy a friendship, discover something new or contribute to another person's happiness.

Thank goodness.

Society has enough administrative requirements already.

But the two perspectives meet in an interesting place.

Fear can loosen when we stop imagining ourselves as isolated entities permanently at war with an external universe.

Understanding relationships can change how we live.

And perhaps happiness becomes more accessible when we recognise that participating in reality doesn't require controlling every aspect of it.

The question worth keeping

Spinoza died in The Hague on 21 February 1677, aged forty-four.

His Ethics appeared posthumously, and the ideas within it continued to provoke, inspire and infuriate readers.

For some, he was a dangerous atheist.

For others, a radical thinker of God and nature.

For later philosophers, he became a central figure in debates about freedom, mind, material reality and the possibility of understanding the whole.

There is something wonderfully human about that history.

One individual develops an account of reality.

Centuries pass.

Other people encounter his arguments, disagree with him, reinterpret him and discover new questions.

His work becomes part of relationships he could never have known.

The Smiling Monad doesn't need to declare him an ancestor, a supporter or an influence.

He is a person whose ideas provide an especially revealing conversation.

He asks us to consider whether all things belong within one underlying reality.

The Smiling Monad asks whether that reality is consciousness expressing itself through distinct, connected experiences.

Spinoza invites us to understand the causes of our emotions and actions.

The Smiling Monad asks what such understanding means for the way we encounter one another.

He reminds us that freedom cannot be separated from how the world actually works.

And his political limitations remind us that lofty claims about humanity are insufficient unless they include actual human beings.

Perhaps the most fascinating outcome is that a philosopher who believed reality follows an intelligible order can still surprise us more than three centuries later.

We don't have to agree with him.

We don't even have to enjoy reading geometric proofs about the nature of infinity.

Although if that's your preferred Saturday afternoon, splendid. The universe can accommodate a remarkable variety of hobbies.

We can simply recognise the value of his question.

What if everything we encounter already belongs to one reality—and what would change if we took that seriously?

Not an excuse to ignore suffering.

Not a demand that everyone believe the same thing.

And certainly not permission to replace real people with elegant philosophical diagrams.

Just a reason to look again at the world in front of us.

The trees.

The music.

The people.

The extraordinary fact that, while we argue about the ultimate nature of existence, we are already living within it.

Spinoza spent a remarkable life trying to explain the whole.

Perhaps the least we can do is remember to enjoy—and care for—some of the parts.

Ben Grey · 14 November 2026

Further reading

- Baruch Spinoza, Ethics (written before 1677; published posthumously in 1677).
• Baruch Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise (1670).
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Baruch Spinoza”: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Spinoza's Psychological Theory”: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-psychological/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Spinoza's Modal Metaphysics”: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-modal/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Spinoza's Theory of Attributes”: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-attributes/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Spinoza's Political Philosophy”: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2026/entries/spinoza-political/
• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Spinoza”: https://iep.utm.edu/spinoza/
• Cambridge University Press, “Spinoza's Life,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (2021): https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-spinoza/spinozas-life/BB01FADE7D59D6E2A767D8481F875D4A