Leibniz — The Universe with No Windows
Imagine a universe filled with an infinite number of clocks.
Every clock is different. Every clock has its own face, its own mechanism and its own particular way of showing the time.
And every single clock is perfectly synchronised with all the others.
There is just one unusual feature.
None of them can communicate.
No wires. No wireless connection. No message passing from one mechanism to the next.
If one clock strikes twelve, the others don't hear it. They were already going to strike twelve anyway.
You might reasonably ask what sort of lunatic would design a universe like that.
Meet Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.
A brilliant mathematician, philosopher, diplomat, inventor and apparently a man who could not look at the entire structure of existence without deciding that it needed a rather more sophisticated explanation.
In the early eighteenth century, he developed a remarkable picture of reality composed of indivisible, mind-like units called monads.
Each expressed the universe from its own perspective.
Each contained its own principle of change.
And none could directly alter another.
It's one of the most audacious proposals in the history of philosophy.
It's also an especially interesting place to begin examining a philosophy called The Smiling Monad.
Because the names sound familiar.
The universes behind them are not the same.
An extraordinary mind with a lot going on
Leibniz was born in Leipzig in 1646, in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War, and became one of the great intellectual figures of early modern Europe.
He studied law, mathematics, philosophy and theology, worked in diplomacy and court administration, helped develop calculating machines and contributed to the mathematical methods we now call calculus.
He also pursued a version of binary arithmetic using zero and one, long before electronic computers would make those digits famous.
Naturally, he became embroiled in one of history's most spectacular academic arguments: who had invented calculus, Leibniz or Isaac Newton?
Both made major, independent contributions. Their supporters managed to turn mathematical discovery into a dispute of magnificent bitterness.
It's encouraging to remember that even people capable of inventing the mathematics used to describe the movement of planets can occasionally behave like children arguing over who thought of a game first.
Leibniz wasn't content with mathematical ingenuity.
He wanted a framework in which logic, nature, mind, physical phenomena and God formed an intelligible whole.
One of his guiding principles was that things ought to have sufficient reasons—explanations for why they are as they are rather than otherwise.
That's a powerful intellectual instinct.
It's also capable of keeping a philosopher occupied for a lifetime.
If everything has an explanation, you eventually have to consider why there is an everything to explain.
Leibniz did.
And his answer became increasingly strange.
What is a monad?
The word monad comes from an old Greek term associated with unity or oneness.
Leibniz didn't invent the word. It had appeared in ancient Greek and later philosophical traditions.
But he developed an exceptionally distinctive account of what a monad is.
A monad, in his mature system, is a simple substance.
Simple doesn't mean easy to understand. Philosophers have never been particularly committed to that definition of simple.
It means having no parts.
A monad cannot be cut in half, disassembled or divided into smaller physical components.
It isn't a tiny marble hiding inside an atom.
It has no physical dimensions.
Leibniz reasoned that composite things require genuinely unified foundations. If everything were merely an arrangement of parts, what would ultimately account for real unity?
His answer was a world of simple, non-extended substances underlying the physical appearances we experience.
These monads weren't inert dots.
They had internal states.
They represented the world through what Leibniz called perception, and they moved from state to state through an internal principle he called appetition.
Now, before everyone starts imagining a universe in which every grain of sand is privately composing poetry, there's an important distinction.
Leibniz did not think every monad possessed human-style self-awareness.
He distinguished different degrees or kinds of perception, including states that aren't consciously noticed, sensation and reflective thought.
His idea of perception was broader than our everyday use of the word.
That makes his system more sophisticated—and significantly less convenient for anyone trying to reduce it to a motivational quote.
The tiny universe inside each perspective
Here is the idea I find most interesting.
For Leibniz, each monad expresses the entire universe, but from its own particular point of view and with differing degrees of clarity.
Imagine standing at a lookout with a hundred other people.
You're all encountering the same landscape.
But nobody has precisely the same position, memories, attention or experience.
One person notices the ocean.
Another notices birds moving among the trees.
A child is fascinated by a beetle walking across a railing.
Someone else is remembering a parent who once brought them there.
The landscape is shared, but the perspectives are distinct.
This is only an analogy. Leibniz's monads are not literal human observers gathering sensory information through their eyes.
Nevertheless, the image helps convey why his universe wasn't simply a pile of interchangeable spiritual particles.
Difference mattered.
Each monad was distinct.
Each expressed the whole in its own way.
And here the conversation with The Smiling Monad becomes particularly interesting.
The Smiling Monad also takes individual perspectives seriously.
It proposes that one infinitely interconnected consciousness is expressed through countless different experiences.
But it does not follow Leibniz in treating those individual perspectives as separate, causally closed substances.
That is a major disagreement.
We should enjoy it rather than smoothing it away.
The universe with no windows
Leibniz famously described monads as having no windows through which anything could enter or leave.
He wasn't recommending an unusual approach to home construction.
He meant that one created substance does not directly cause changes inside another created substance.
But surely we affect one another?
You tell a joke. I laugh.
A musician strikes a drum. Another musician changes the rhythm.
A friend speaks to me about something painful, and the conversation changes how I understand my own experience.
Those seem like perfectly ordinary examples of interaction.
Leibniz's answer was extraordinary.
At the deepest metaphysical level, the internal changes of each substance unfold according to its own nature.
The apparent coordination between substances results from a pre-established harmony instituted by God.
The clocks were synchronised from the beginning.
What appears to be one monad influencing another is, within the underlying structure, the coordination of their independently unfolding states.
This doesn't mean Leibniz denied the usefulness of describing everyday physical causes.
At the level of the phenomena we encounter, ordinary explanations about bodies, movement and interaction still have their place.
His claim concerns the deeper metaphysical foundation of those appearances.
And that's where things become truly peculiar.
Imagine two musicians performing a duet.
One hears the other's rhythm and adjusts.
That's the interaction as we normally understand it.
Now imagine the players are incapable of hearing one another, but have been given perfectly coordinated performances. Every note fits. Every pause coincides. Every change arrives at precisely the right moment.
From the audience, the duet sounds responsive.
At the deepest level, however, neither musician is changing because of what the other is doing.
That's closer to Leibniz's conception.
It is also precisely where The Smiling Monad wants to ask another question.
But what if the music really is shared?
For The Smiling Monad, participation isn't merely the appearance of interaction between independently programmed inner worlds.
The possibility of one underlying consciousness changes the starting point.
Individual experiences are not self-contained substances that happen to keep time with one another.
They are expressions within a reality already fundamentally united.
And the unfolding of relationships matters.
Consider an improvised conversation.
One person says something unexpected.
The second person changes direction.
A joke appears that neither intended.
A new idea emerges because the conversation took a turn that could not have been anticipated from either person's separate plan.
In our ordinary experience, this is genuinely interactive.
A person listening responds to what another person communicates.
The Smiling Monad takes that kind of relationship seriously.
But we shouldn't pretend the conversation itself proves the metaphysical difference.
Leibniz could account for the same observable exchange through his pre-established harmony.
Both interpretations can accommodate the appearance of people influencing one another.
The disagreement is about what makes the coordination possible at the deepest level.
And that disagreement cannot be settled simply by declaring that relationships feel real.
Philosophy has a nasty habit of making even the obvious things less obvious.
That's partly why it's interesting.
The difference between individuality and isolation
There's another issue worth sorting out.
It's tempting to describe Leibniz's monads as lonely little minds trapped inside windowless boxes.
But that image is misleading if we take it too far.
A Leibnizian monad isn't ignorant of the universe.
Its very nature involves representing the universe.
All monads belong within an overarching order.
The supposed isolation concerns direct causal influence between substances—not an absence of cosmic coordination.
So we shouldn't accuse Leibniz of teaching that nothing is connected.
He taught an extraordinarily comprehensive kind of harmony.
The question is whether a harmony without direct interaction gives us the account of connection we want.
The Smiling Monad approaches connection differently.
It doesn't begin with many self-sufficient substances requiring an external principle to keep them aligned.
It begins with one consciousness, within which innumerable individual experiences can unfold.
That doesn't erase individuality.
It changes the proposed relationship between individuality and its source.
We might say that Leibniz begins with distinct centres and explains their harmony.
The Smiling Monad begins with unity and explores the variety of perspectives within it.
They are not minor variations on the same theory.
They're different ways of explaining why the many can belong to one reality.
Nobody is a duplicate
Leibniz also defended the identity of indiscernibles: roughly, the claim that there cannot be two genuinely distinct things with all the same properties.
If two things are absolutely identical in every respect, what would make them two rather than one?
There are complexities and objections surrounding how this principle should be understood, especially in modern metaphysics and physics.
But it offers an excellent starting point for thinking about individuality.
Think of two people attending the same concert.
They hear the same music in the same room.
Yet their histories, attention, bodily experiences and relationships differ.
One is overwhelmed by a memory.
Another is excited by the rhythm.
A third is annoyed that someone in front of them has decided to film the entire performance on a phone.
The event is shared.
The experience is not duplicated.
The Smiling Monad's account of infinite perspectives recognises something similar: difference isn't an unfortunate interruption of unity.
It is central to the variety of experience.
But again, the resemblance shouldn't conceal the distinction.
For Leibniz, monads are distinct genuine substances.
For The Smiling Monad, individual perspectives belong within an ultimately unified consciousness.
Those accounts disagree about what individuality fundamentally consists of.
Yet both resist treating the cosmos as a monotonous collection of indistinguishable units.
A universe with only one perspective would be rather short of conversation.
A philosophy that keeps unfolding
There's a fascinating tension in Leibniz's universe.
Each monad has an internal principle of change.
Its perceptions unfold over time.
So existence is not static.
But that unfolding belongs within a complete, divinely coordinated world.
Leibniz also developed the doctrine that each individual substance has a complete concept containing truths about its history.
That raises difficult questions about contingency, freedom and whether the future is already determined.
Philosophers continue to disagree about how best to understand his answers.
The Smiling Monad's cosmology gives continuing creation a more central role.
Reality is not simply a finished arrangement established in the past and gradually revealed through a predetermined sequence.
Its picture is of an infinite, ongoing unfolding of thought, experience and possibility.
The language of creation doesn't require a first moment somewhere behind us.
It describes a process in which we are presently participating.
This sounds liberating.
It also creates questions that must be faced rather than avoided.
If every possibility belongs within an infinite reality, does every imaginable world actually exist?
Not necessarily. Conceivability does not establish existence.
If we participate in unfolding reality, how much is genuinely open and how much depends on conditions we do not control?
That's a serious question.
And if one consciousness is fundamental, what exactly distinguishes one personal experience from another?
Leibniz doesn't solve those questions for The Smiling Monad.
He helps expose why they matter.
The best of all possible worlds? Seriously?
Now we arrive at the idea most likely to make a sceptical reader throw the book across the room.
Leibniz argued that God, being perfectly wise and good, chooses the best of all possible worlds.
That claim was part of his attempt to understand how evil could exist within a creation governed by a perfect God.
He wasn't simply saying that every horrible event is wonderful when examined from the correct angle.
His philosophical account was more complicated. It involved possible worlds, divine choice, order, perfection and the claim that the overall world could be best despite containing evils.
But the problem is obvious.
Look around.
War. Cruelty. Disease. Poverty. Children suffering. The extraordinary ability of powerful people to create preventable misery while announcing that everything is proceeding according to plan.
Is this really the best we could do?
A philosophy that concludes the actual world must be optimal faces the difficult task of explaining suffering without dismissing the people experiencing it.
Voltaire famously mocked this kind of optimism in Candide, published in 1759, long after Leibniz's death.
The satire was not a careful scholarly reconstruction of Leibniz. Its target included a broader habit of treating catastrophe as evidence of some hidden perfection.
Nevertheless, the criticism landed because it revealed something emotionally and ethically dangerous.
If a system convinces us that whatever happens must belong to the best possible arrangement, we may become less willing to challenge avoidable harm.
And that's a very bad outcome.
Suffering is not evidence of a perfect plan
The Smiling Monad has its own account of suffering.
Within the philosophy, individual experiences can be understood in relation to a much larger consciousness.
Recognising that proposed source may change how some people understand their circumstances and help them find peace.
But this must not become a claim that cruelty is necessary or that suffering should be welcomed as a gift from the universe.
A person suffering remains a person suffering.
If something can be prevented, we should investigate how to prevent it.
If someone is being mistreated, the question isn't whether their pain serves an obscure cosmic purpose.
It's how to protect them.
And if an institution profits from keeping people dependent, then an interconnected understanding of existence gives us more reason to examine the institution—not less.
There is no need to pretend the overall reality is a finished, perfect product.
The Smiling Monad's emphasis on continuing unfolding leaves room to recognise that the lives we share can be improved through what we do.
That's important.
An explanation of the universe should not become an excuse to stop participating in it.
Especially when participation could make somebody else's experience better.
Do the little clocks have free will?
Pre-established harmony raises another interesting problem.
If every monad unfolds according to its own complete nature, and God has selected the overall world, in what sense are our choices free?
Leibniz defended a sophisticated account of freedom and contingency.
He did not regard human beings as ordinary clockwork mechanisms compelled from outside.
But it's fair to ask whether an entirely pre-coordinated reality gives individual choice the kind of openness we commonly imagine.
This is not a problem exclusive to Leibniz.
Modern science and philosophy also debate determinism, causation, agency and the nature of decision-making.
The Smiling Monad should not escape the difficulty merely by changing the vocabulary.
If our perspectives are expressions of one consciousness, how do we understand personal responsibility?
What does choosing mean?
How can a person influence their own circumstances while remaining subject to biology, history, other people and physical constraints?
These questions matter particularly in everyday relationships.
It's easy to celebrate choice in the abstract.
It's harder to create the conditions through which another person can actually exercise it.
Someone may need information in an accessible form.
They may need time, support or opportunities to communicate in ways that others don't immediately recognise.
They may need freedom from unnecessary control.
A philosophical account of choice becomes more credible when it takes those practical realities seriously.
Otherwise free will risks becoming another splendid concept that functions perfectly until an actual human being tries to use it.
From mathematics to the mess of living
There is something touching about Leibniz's ambition.
He wanted the world to be intelligible.
He pursued systems of reasoning, mathematics and symbolic representation because he believed that confusion could often be reduced through clearer thought.
That's an extraordinary intellectual contribution.
We should be grateful for it.
But human life contains experiences that resist being handled as though they were merely problems in formal logic.
You can map a relationship.
You cannot reduce its emotional significance to the map.
You can describe the acoustic properties of a song.
You cannot guarantee what that song will mean to everyone who hears it.
You can construct an elaborate theory of coordinated mental states.
That doesn't replace the experience of sitting with another person, listening carefully and allowing the conversation to change you.
None of this establishes that Leibniz was wrong.
It points to the difference between a philosophical model and the experiences the model attempts to explain.
Models can be extraordinarily useful.
But the map is not the walk.
And a perfectly synchronised clock is not necessarily the best metaphor for two people learning to trust one another.
On the anniversary of an extraordinary life
There's a remarkable coincidence in the date of this essay.
Leibniz died on 14 November 1716.
This essay is dated 14 November 2026—exactly 310 years later.
Three centuries and another decade have passed, and we're still arguing about the nature of individuality, consciousness, causation and reality.
In one sense that's rather embarrassing.
We've built spacecraft and quantum computers and still haven't achieved universal agreement on what the universe actually is.
In another sense it's wonderful.
A philosopher working centuries ago can still enter a conversation with people he could never have imagined.
His arguments can be studied, criticised, extended and challenged.
His particular life has ended.
His ideas continue to affect the experiences of other people.
A literal Leibnizian monad would not receive new impressions from this conversation by metaphysical causal exchange.
But human conversations about Leibniz plainly continue to develop, in the ordinary world we inhabit.
And that's exactly where The Smiling Monad places its attention.
Not in claiming that a famous philosopher secretly taught the same ideas.
Not in borrowing a familiar word and pretending every theory attached to it must agree.
But in recognising that different perspectives can help us explore questions no single perspective has exhausted.
Leibniz offers a universe of countless distinct centres reflecting a coordinated whole.
The difference is not merely a change of name: Leibniz's monads have no windows, while relationships and lived encounters are central to the question explored here.
One explains harmony between independent substances.
The other begins from fundamental unity and asks what unfolds through connection.
Both are bold.
Both raise questions.
Neither should be mistaken for a laboratory demonstration of the ultimate structure of reality.
And perhaps the most productive response isn't to declare a winner.
It's to keep talking.
If the universe really has no windows, we've done an extraordinary job of appearing to reach one another anyway.
But I rather prefer a picture in which the windows are open.
Someone is playing music next door.
A friend has something unexpected to say.
A child has invented a game nobody has played before.
And a few hundred years after Leibniz, the conversation is still unfolding.
Ben Grey · 14 November 2026
Further reading
- G. W. Leibniz, The Monadology (written 1714), English translation hosted by the University of Cincinnati: https://homepages.uc.edu/~martinj/History_of_Logic/Leibniz/Leibniz%20-%20Monadology.pdf
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Leibniz on Causation: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-causation/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Leibniz on the Problem of Evil: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Leibniz's Modal Metaphysics: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-modal/
• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Leibniz: Metaphysics: https://iep.utm.edu/leib-met/
• Leibniz University Hannover, The Life and Work of Leibniz: https://www.uni-hannover.de/en/universitaet/profil/leibniz/lebenslauf
• Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2016).
